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THE IMPLICATIONS OF MEMETICS FOR THE
CULTURAL DEFENSE
NEAL A. GORDON
INTRODUCTION
The cultural defense has been the subject of a great deal of re-
cent scholarship. Much of this analysis has concerned the conse-
quences of the cultural defense, both for defendants and victims.1
Scholars differ on what these unintended consequences may be, how-
ever, and identify effects ranging from encouraging American ideals2
to spreading racism,3 to legitimizing violence against women.4 Al-
though seemingly contradictory, these analyses are warranted as they
address a legal strategy that often draws from culturally specific
norms concerning marriage and domestic relations.5 Because norms
are central to every culture, use of the cultural defense potentially has
a profound effect on many immigrant communities.
Few commentators focus on the philosophical foundation of the
cultural defense and whether it forms an adequate basis for excuse
from punishment, however. Retribution often is a primary justifica-
Copyright © 2001 by Neal A. Gordon.
1. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicultur-
alism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (discussing the effects of the cul-
tural defense on victims); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural
Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1994) (objecting to the defense on the grounds that it
overlooks the subordination that Asian women face); Michael Fischer, Note, The Human Rights
Implications of a “Cultural Defense,” 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 663 (1998) (describing the con-
flict between cultural practices and treasured human rights).
2. Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1986).
3. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1134-35.
4. Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women
in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1315-20
(1991).
5. There is no formal cultural defense. For a brief definition and explication of how the
cultural defense can operate, see infra Part I.
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tion for punishment.6 The cultural defense concludes that because a
defendant acted in a “culturally motivated manner,” he is not morally
blameworthy and hence should be partially excused.7 The cultural de-
fense makes use of a common assumption in criminal law: if the de-
fendant cannot control her actions, she generally should not be held
responsible for them.8
This Note challenges this common assumption in the specific
context of the cultural defense. By seeking to exculpate a defendant
for culturally influenced behavior, the volitional cultural defense9 de-
nies the defendant’s ability to resist the compulsions of his culture. I
do not argue that the defendant can or should be able to act inde-
pendently of his cultural background; rather I submit that the cultural
defense fails to draw any significant distinctions between defendants
and the general populace. Everyone is at the mercy of the ideas he
encounters; the cultural defense just arbitrarily defines culture nar-
rowly enough to shut out most of these compulsions. From a moral—
and hence retributivist—viewpoint, the source of these irresistible
impulses should make no difference.
Part I examines the cultural defense in greater detail and deline-
ates its cognitive component (in which a defendant may not recognize
a law or fact) from its volitional component (in which a defendant
recognizes an action is legally wrong but cannot overcome the cul-
tural impulses to act regardless). This part also attempts the impor-
tant—but difficult—task of separating a pure cultural defense from
the mere use of cultural evidence within an existing defense. Part II
presents a new theory of cultural evolution, memetics,10 that elimi-
nates any volition free from broadly defined cultural and genetic in-
fluences. This theory posits that every person, and hence every action,
is the result of influences beyond an individual’s control. Part III
demonstrates that the volitional cultural defense can make no mean-
6. Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 437, 442 (1993).
7. Id. at 488.
8. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 360 N.E.2d 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (reversing defendant’s
conviction for assault on grounds that he suffered from automatism and that his actions were
therefore involuntary).
9. The term is defined and distinguished at infra note 32 and accompanying text.
10. The relationship between memetics and the law has previously been explored in Mi-
chael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J.
291 (1999). Fried examines the evolution of the law in terms of memes, while this Note is more
concerned with the philosophical implications of memetics for the criminal law, and the cultural
defense in particular.
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ingful distinctions, as everyone is acting under cultural compulsions.
This part also investigates the roles of deterrence and rehabilitation in
a system largely void of retribution. The Note concludes by employ-
ing the memetic perspective to reexamine some of the existing conse-
quentialist analyses of the cultural defense.
I.  THE CULTURAL DEFENSE
The cultural defense has not been formalized11—an attorney can-
not walk into a courtroom and plead “the cultural defense.” Hence it
will not fit neatly into one definition. It has been defined as “a legal
strategy that defendants use in attempts to excuse criminal behavior
or to mitigate culpability based on a lack of requisite mens rea,”12
“[t]he affirmative presentation of foreign customs as exonerating evi-
dence in criminal cases,”13 and “a defense asserted by immigrants,
refugees, and indigenous people based on their customs or customary
law.”14 This lack of specificity in the defense leads to its application in
a number of diverse cases without a clear statement of what it is try-
ing to prove or disprove.15 The problem is further complicated by the
frequent confusion of the cultural defense with the use of cultural
evidence within existing defenses. As a result, it is particularly worth-
while to attempt to explain how the cultural defense operates and to
partition its uses along a major divide.
There are important—and often misunderstood—differences be-
tween the cultural defense and the use of cultural evidence. The cul-
tural defense proper operates outside of criminal law’s existing
mechanisms and attempts to excuse the defendant for admittedly
wrong conduct.16 A true cultural defense is closely parallel to the in-
sanity defense—both seek to excuse a defendant because he either
did not know his actions were wrong or could not control them.17 The
defendant cannot disprove an element of the crime but seeks to be
excused anyway, essentially because he could not help himself. Cul-
11. Volpp, supra note 1, at 57.
12. Id.
13. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1100.
14. Renteln, supra note 6, at 439.
15. See Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A
Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 117-21 (1997) (examining various misuses of cul-
tural evidence).
16. See Renteln, supra note 6, at 490-92 (arguing that the cultural defense be used as a par-
tial excuse).
17. Kim, supra note 15, at 109.
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tural evidence, on the other hand, may fit neatly into the existing
criminal law framework. A defendant may use cultural evidence to
show, for example, that she suffered extreme emotional disturbance.18
If cultural evidence is merely used within the existing framework, it
presents no philosophical problem as it functions in the same way as
any other type of evidence. The proper use of cultural evidence
makes justice more precise without sacrificing analytical rigor.
Arguably, the pure cultural defense has never been used by itself.
Because the defense has not been adopted formally, defense attor-
neys often seek to introduce cultural evidence without explicitly stat-
ing the purpose of such evidence.19 People v. Chen20 may be the best
example of the cultural defense, however, because the cultural evi-
dence was not used to assert a traditional defense. Chen, upon learn-
ing of his wife’s marital wanderings, killed her in a vicious attack.21
The judge reduced the charge from second degree murder to second
degree manslaughter, which only requires “recklessness,” “after
hearing testimony that Chinese culture condemned adultery.”22
Chen’s acts—striking his wife eight times with a claw hammer—were
clearly intentional and should have warranted a charge of at least first
degree manslaughter under New York law.23 The problem is that
Chen’s attorney did not use cultural evidence to establish reckless-
ness, but rather used it to mitigate the punishment.24 This demon-
strates a significant interpretative problem in the field: defense attor-
neys often seek to introduce cultural evidence for whatever it is
worth, rather than specifically to negate mens rea or to advance some
other established defense. This can make for some interesting logic:
Chen “argued simultaneously that his rage was governed by his cul-
tural predispositions to such an extent that he became mentally un-
stable, and that he purposefully acted his part in a culturally rational
traditional practice.”25 The difficulty lies in how to interpret the use of
18. See People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (analyzing the effects on
the defendant of cultural taboos about adultery). Technically, Wu argued that her extreme emo-
tional distress rendered her unconscious. Id.
19. See Kim, supra note 15, at 118-19; infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
20. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989). For an excellent discussion of Chen, see
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea 2 (2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Duke Law Journal).
21. Coleman, supra note 20, at 3.
22. Kim, supra note 15, at 120.
23. Id. at 119-20.
24. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
25. Coleman, supra note 20, at 10.
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the cultural evidence—is it a sloppy attempt to use an existing de-
fense or a veiled attempt to mitigate punishment based on the idea
that the defendant is less culpable?
It is additionally helpful to split the cultural defense into cogni-
tive and volitional components.26 The cognitive portion refers to cases
in which “the individual simply did not believe that his or her actions
contravened any laws.”27 Thus, the cognitive cultural defense would
encompass cases of mistake or ignorance of law and mistake of fact.
The defendant uses cultural evidence to show that she either did not
realize there was a prohibition on her actions or that her actions were
different from what is prohibited.
One example is People v. Moua.28 This case involved the Laotian
custom of “marriage-by-capture,” in which, in order to be wed, the
female must protest the male’s sexual advances to prove herself vir-
tuous and the man strong.29 Moua forced a Laotian woman from
Fresno City College to engage in sexual intercourse; at trial, he ar-
gued that he was simply engaging in the Laotian ritual.30 If we inter-
pret Moua’s actions to mean that he knew rape was illegal but did not
think this was rape, his actions show that cultural influences pre-
vented him from realizing the vital fact. The cognitive cultural de-
fense thus attempts to show that the defendant, while perfectly sane
and rational, was incapable of committing an act satisfying all the
elements of the crime because cultural differences prevented him
from being aware of a necessary fact or law.31
26. Renteln, supra note 6, at 439.
27. Id.
28. No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno County Feb. 7, 1985).
29. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1106.
30. Id. He was ordered to serve 120 days in jail and pay a $1,000 fine. Id.
31. Renteln, supra note 6, at 439. It is thus arguable that the cognitive cultural defense is
not really a pure cultural defense at all but is rather an example of the permissible use of cul-
tural evidence. For example, Moua can be interpreted as a simple mistake-of-fact case in which
Moua’s cultural beliefs prevented him from realizing that his victim was not consenting. This
may well be true, as the cognitive cultural defense and the simple use of cultural evidence seem
quite similar and neither appear vulnerable to the criticisms leveled by this Note. The Note ex-
presses no opinion whether there is a fully-formed, independent cognitive cultural defense; it
concentrates instead on the failings of a volitional cultural defense that excuses actions that can-
not be defended by the use of cultural evidence within an existing defense.
Conversely, Moua may also be interpreted as a volitional cultural defense case. An-
other Hmong defendant claimed, “In my culture there is no such thing as rape.” Minnesota v.
Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see also Note, supra note 2, at 1302 (“[T]he
ideology of honor is a fundamental precept to which people look for guidance and around which
they structure their social relations.”). Moua therefore may have known that the sex was non-
GORDON 06/02/01 2:36 PM
1814 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1809
The volitional aspect of the cultural defense stands in sharp con-
trast. The volitional cultural defense argues in essence that the defen-
dant knows her conduct is legally wrong but, due to cultural influ-
ences, cannot refrain from such conduct.32 The defendant claims that
she is not as culpable as she would be had she not been compelled by
cultural forces, and the defense is thus similar to diminished capacity
and insanity. Examples include People v. Chen33 and arguably People
v. Kimura.34
After hearing of her husband’s infidelity, Kimura, a Japanese-
American woman, walked into the ocean holding her two children.35
Her children drowned, but she survived. On trial for murder, she used
cultural evidence to argue that she was following the Japanese ritual
of oya-ko shinju, or parent-child suicide.36 Though cultural evidence
was not formally admitted, the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain
for voluntary manslaughter on the grounds that Kimura was “tempo-
rarily insane.”37 The “evidence” not admitted consisted in part of a
petition of 25,000 signatures from the Los Angeles Japanese commu-
nity explaining the ritual of oya-ko shinju.38 Kimura was sentenced to
“one year in prison (which she had served already) and five years
probation; she walked out of the courtroom a free woman.”39
The Kimura case thus may be viewed as a cloaked cultural de-
fense; Kimura’s attorney attempted to reduce her sentence without
explicitly defining how the cultural evidence was relevant. The same
result in the case might have been obtained if Kimura had simply
tried to argue extreme emotional disturbance. This lack of clarity al-
lows the case to be interpreted either as a cultural defense case or a
consensual but proceeded anyway. Perhaps he knew that nonconsensual sex was prohibited but
thought it was permissible between two Hmong people. This is all speculation, but it reveals the
difficulties with these cases. They are quite unclear on whether the defendant actually thought
that intercourse with a protesting girl, often under twelve, was consensual; whether the defen-
dant did not think nonconsensual sex was illegal; or whether the defendant knew the act was
illegal in the United States but went ahead anyway because of cultural compulsion. The first two
alternatives do seem a bit farfetched, which is perhaps why defense attorneys are often vague in
their use of cultural evidence.
32. Renteln, supra note 6, at 439; Fischer, supra note 1, at 670.
33. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
34. No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Nov. 21, 1985).
35. Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Crimi-
nal Justice System Formally Recognize a “Cultural Defense”?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141, 147 (1994).
36. Id. at 147-48.
37. Kim, supra note 15, at 118.
38. Fischer, supra note 1, at 673.
39. Id.
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use-of-cultural-evidence case. In any event, the case does seem to in-
volve the “misuse” of cultural evidence, as it neither fits within the
existing framework nor explicitly attempts to assert a pure cultural
defense.40
Chen also is problematic. “Chen’s lawyer . . . claimed that ‘the
basis for the defense was not that it’s acceptable to kill your wife in
China. The basis of the defense is the emotional strain based on cul-
tural differences and the state of the defendant’s mind.’”41 Further-
more, the “notion that Chen lacked free will, that he was, in effect,
controlled by the ‘voice of the [Chinese] community’ that ‘will be
heard everywhere’ was a central theme of Chen’s defense.”42 While
Chen’s defense certainly has some echoes of extreme emotional dis-
turbance, it should have been enough only to reduce the charge to
first degree manslaughter, not second degree.43 The judge’s finding
that Chen’s wielding of the claw hammer was merely “reckless” must
therefore contain elements of excuse based on a volitional cultural
defense and not be solely derived from a tidy attempt to demonstrate
emotional disturbance.
Both the cognitive and volitional cultural defenses are premised
on the notion that sometimes “an individual’s behavior is influenced
to such a large extent by his or her culture” that he commits an act for
reasons beyond his control.44 The difference between the cognitive
and volitional components of the defense is that, under the cognitive
portion, the defendant claims that cultural forces prevented him from
realizing a fact, but he otherwise acted of his own free choice. Again,
this simply may be a specific use of cultural evidence within the es-
tablished legal framework. Under the volitional portion, however, the
defendant admits he knew his actions were wrong but claims that he
could not help himself. The defendant using the cognitive cultural de-
fense claims not to have known better, while the defendant using the
volitional prong claims that he did not have any choice.
40. See Kim, supra note 15, at 118-19 (noting that Kimura was excused “because her ad-
herence to oya-ko shinju was used to prove that she was temporarily insane”).
41. Id. at 120 (quoting Leslie Gevirtz, Immigrant Gets Probation for Killing Wife, U.P.I.,
Mar. 31, 1989, available at LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, UPI File (quoting defense attorney
Stewart Orden)).
42. Coleman, supra note 20, at 6.
43. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
44. Todd Taylor, Note, The Cultural Defense and Its Irrelevancy in Child Protection Law,
17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 331, 344 (1997).
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This Note is concerned primarily with the cultural defense as it
seeks to excuse the defendant based on notions of a lessened culpa-
bility due to the behavior’s cultural motivation. It argues that the voli-
tional prong is essentially meaningless in that it fails to distinguish be-
tween situations in which a person’s actions are freely chosen and
those in which they are not. To do this, it is necessary to present a
theory of culture that shows that we are all purely products of our cul-
ture and our biology, and that our actions must therefore be ex-
plained in these terms as well.
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
A. Memetics Explained
The volitional cultural defense claims that people from foreign
cultures should be excused when they are unable to control their ac-
tions due to cultural influences and that they therefore are less mor-
ally culpable. In doing so, the defense implicitly assumes that people
from the domestic culture are freely able to conform their actions to
the law. In order for there to be an exception to free choice, it must
be the norm. But what if people cannot freely choose their actions in
any meaningful moral sense? What if everyone’s actions are the result
of factors, both cultural and genetic, beyond his or her control?
To show that this may in fact be the case, it is necessary to turn to
the theory of memetics.45 Technically, a meme is “[a]n element of a
culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means,
[especially] imitation”;46 more crudely, a meme is an idea. Examples
of memes include the chorus of a song, equality, heaven, voting,
fashion, and language. The biologist Richard Dawkins proposed me-
mes as units of cultural evolution.47 In order for culture to be able to
evolve, it must be able to be broken down into units that are able to
45. Actually, all that is necessary is some theory of “mindless” or mechanical cultural evo-
lution. There are many theories of cultural evolution, both mechanical and otherwise. See gen-
erally THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE—AN INTERDISCIPLINARY VIEW (Robin Dunbar et al.
eds., 1999) (collecting essays from various disciplines about cultural evolution). Memetics is a
convenient theory, but it is just that—a theory. Should it be disfavored, some other theory of
cultural evolution may well fit the bill.
46. Oxford English Dictionary Online, available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/
00298365 (last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (defining “meme”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
47. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192 (new ed. 1989) (1976).
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reproduce themselves; a meme thus is a discrete idea that is capable
of replicating.48
In order to replicate, memes must be capable of being stored and
spread. The human mind is the ideal vehicle—it is able to store ideas
and reliably reproduce them through language.49 Not all memetic rep-
lication must be achieved through language as a person may simply
observe a good idea and imitate it,50 but language greatly increases the
speed and breadth of a meme’s progress.51
Memes are of philosophical and psychological interest because of
the process by which they evolve. Meme theory holds that memes
evolve in the same manner that plants and animals evolve—by the
process of natural selection.52 Memes, as their name suggests, are
analogous to genes in that both satisfy the evolutionary criteria of
variation, replication, and fitness.53 While the precise neurological
mechanisms of memetic evolution may remain unknown or not exist
at all,54 the comparison between memes and genes is more than meta-
48. DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE
MEANINGS OF LIFE 344-45 (1995). As ideas are somewhat difficult to isolate into discreet units,
there is still some question as to what exactly constitutes a meme. For example, “[i]s Beetho-
ven’s Fifth Symphony a meme, or only the first four notes?” SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME
MACHINE 53 (1999). They both are memes. The symphony itself is a coherent whole that of
course replicates every time it is played. The first four notes, however, are probably the more
successful meme. They replicate not only when they are played by a symphony or on the radio,
but whenever someone hums them. Except for the musical geniuses of the world, it is difficult to
keep the entire symphony in one’s head and then hum it aloud. The first four notes may there-
fore be more prevalent in the public’s consciousness than the whole symphony. Some people
may be aware of the first four notes without knowing where they came from, but that does not
preclude the symphony from being itself a meme. The lack of specificity regarding the definition
of a meme does not appear to be a problem for memetics, and it is immaterial for our purposes
here whether an idea is broken down into its smallest possible components. See id. at 56 (argu-
ing that all that matters for memetic theory is that a meme is replicated, not whether the meme
consists of a few notes or a whole song).
49. See Susan Blackmore, The Power of Memes, SCI. AM., Oct. 2000, at 69-71 (relating how
evolution shaped the human brain to be well-suited for language).
50. Memes are not entirely unique to humans; bird songs are good examples of memes in
the animal kingdom. See JOHN TYLER BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE IN ANIMALS
119-20 (1980) (noting that bird songs are the product of both genetic inheritance and cultural
assimilation); see also Lee Alan Dugatkin, Animals Imitate, Too, SCI. AM., Oct. 2000, at 67
(“Memes may be older and more fundamental to biological evolution than Blackmore or any-
one else has argued to date.”).
51. See Blackmore, supra note 49, at 70 (explaining how sounds—and words in particular—
have “high[er] fecundity, fidelity and longevity” than other methods of communication).
52. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 345.
53. Id. at 343.
54. It is possible that there are precise memetic analogues to all the genetic mechanisms,
such as DNA and codons. Id. at 345. This is highly unlikely and irrelevant for our purposes.
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phorical. Both follow the same mindless process of mutation and se-
lection.
As an example, consider a recent meme: the symbol :) that has
permeated e-mail.55 As one of many symbols called “emoticons,” :) is
particularly well-suited to the medium of e-mail; it connotes a play-
fulness that would be evident in voice communications but is other-
wise lost in a world of ASCII characters. As people have received e-
mail messages containing :), they have recognized its usefulness and
incorporated it into their own messages. :) has proven particularly fit,
has replicated at breakneck pace, and is now ubiquitous. Like genes, a
meme’s fitness is its replicative power; in the case of :), it is a function
of the meme’s unique appropriateness to the medium. It has repli-
cated so well because it is so good at what it does. And as with genes,
there are mutations—:(, ;), :0, etc. These mutated memes have all
replicated because of their own fitness. And eventually, due to over-
use, their cleverness and originality will diminish, and they will gradu-
ally disappear.
Some have argued that memetics is Lamarckian.56 While
Lamarckianism, if true, would perhaps deal a fatal blow to the Dar-
winian theory of genetic evolution, the charge is not as serious with
respect to memetics because “memes are not confined by the rigid
structure of DNA.”57 The lack of stasis that makes defining memes so
difficult also enables the theory possibly to be Lamarckian without
disproving the theory.58 A related charge is that memetic mutation is
What is important is that the process of natural selection—selection based on fitness—is the
same.
55. The symbol :) is known as an emoticon. An emoticon is a “typewritten picture of a fa-
cial expression, used in e-mail and when communicating on the Internet, to indicate emotion.”
TechDictionary.com, the online computer dictionary, at http://www.techdictionary.com (last
visited Apr. 10, 2001). The emoticons used in this Note represent a smile, a frown, a wink, and
surprise, respectively. See Techdictionary.com, the online computer dictionary, Smilies—Emot-
icons, at http://www.techdictionary.com/emoticon.html and http://www.techdictionary.com/
emoticon_cont.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2001).
56. BLACKMORE, supra note 48, at 59. “Lamarckian” refers to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s
refuted theory that acquired physical characteristics can be inherited.
57. Id. at 62.
58. Dennett demonstrates this point by analogizing to viruses. There is no distinction be-
tween a soma and germ line in a virus, so it is impossible to tell whether a change in the appear-
ance of the virus is a phenotypic change or a genotypic change (a mutation). Daniel C. Dennett,
Memes: Myths, Misunderstandings and Misgivings, § 2, at http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/
MEMEMYTH.FIN.htm (last visited April 10, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Like
viruses, memes are neither multicellular nor sexual, and hence “the fact that there is no clear
way . . . of distinguishing mutations from phenotypic acquisitions hardly shows that they are dis-
qualified from a neo-Darwinian treatment.” Id.
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directed mutation. This criticism poses no threat because any direc-
tion is simply the result of prior memes and therefore still forecloses
the possibility of a mind free from the infestation of memes.59
To thus dodge the objection is not to concede the point. Dennett
explicitly acknowledges directed mutation: “much of the mutation
that happens to memes—how much is not clear—is manifestly di-
rected mutation.”60 However, the presence of useful and complex
memes should not be construed to mean that they are the only muta-
tions. For instance, the symbol :$ may have occurred to someone, but
it was instantly discarded as meaningless. The same phenomenon oc-
curs with genes—a mutation that produces a nonviable organism will
generally die out with that organism. The rate of mutation and sur-
vival is just much quicker with memes. The sorting of useful and use-
less memes may occur at an unobservably fast pace because the fit-
ness landscape is the human mind. As a further example, consider a
novice poet trying to find a word that rhymes with “child.” The poet
may try to find words alphabetically: “dialed,” “filed,” “piled,” etc.
and may finally settle on “wild.” This does not mean that the poet di-
rected the mutation; it means that “wild” was selected because of its
fitness and the others were discarded as useless irrelevancies.61
Also, memetic mutations seem to occur very frequently—“[w]e
seldom pass on a meme unaltered, it seems, unless we are particularly
literal-minded rote learners.”62 Each time a meme enters a mind it
must compete with all the other memes in it, and every mind is differ-
ent. Thus, every time a meme enters a mind it enters a new fitness
landscape. Different mutations may therefore be successful in each
mind because of the different selection pressures. These are admit-
tedly speculations, but they may demonstrate that directed mutation
does not have to be the only explanation for the selection of appro-
Being Lamarckian would be a distinct benefit for cultural evolution: the eminent evolu-
tionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould argues that a Lamarckian character is the principal power
of cultural evolution. Stephen Jay Gould, Shades of Lamarck, NATURAL HIST., Oct. 1979, at 22,
28. Gould postulates that virtually all advances since the rise of Homo sapiens are due to La-
marckian cultural evolution. Id. Because of the accumulative nature of Lamarckian evolution, it
has transformed the planet in a geological eyeblink.
59. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
60. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 355.
61. Perhaps some minds are structured (by genes and previous memes) such that they are
able to go through this process so quickly that it is not even noticeable and to find words that
are beyond the powers of the novice, such as “beguiled.”
62. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 355.
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priate memes. Even if it is, however, the direction’s own memetic ori-
gins will preserve the algorithmic theory of culture.
B. What’s That Say About Us?
The concept of memes is important, because it offers a mechani-
cal explanation of how our actions are chosen: we follow whatever
notion is strongest in our minds, and the strength of that notion is a
function of fitness. Fitness is defined solely in terms of ability to sur-
vive and replicate;63 therefore the memes that are the strongest and
most widespread are the ones that are best at replicating. This view is
termed the “meme’s-eye perspective.”64 It captures the crucial idea
that memes, like genes, are inherently selfish. They “care” only about
their own survival and benefit and not a whit for that of the host or-
ganism. The most widespread memes are not necessarily the most
beneficial memes; they are simply the memes that are best at spread-
ing.65 Luckily, there seems to be a substantial overlap between memes
that are good replicators and memes that are good for us. This is be-
cause, in general, we pass on (or others pick up on) memes that help
us. This is not, however, a necessary correlation. A meme that is ob-
viously beneficial to us as organisms (say, using a wheel) will be rec-
ognized as such and hence spread. A meme that is recognized as
harmful generally will have a tough time catching on. It is not impos-
sible, however, as demonstrated by the example of suicide.66 Other
memes, such as racism, may provide a limited benefit for the individ-
ual infected with the meme but be quite dangerous to society as a
whole.
Thus, the memes that have become the most widespread and
deeply entrenched are simply the best replicators. “[T]he facts about
whatever we hold dear—our highest values—are themselves very
much a product of the memes that have spread most successfully.”67
63. ANTHONY J.F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 728 (7th
ed. 2000) (defining fitness as “a consequence of the relation between the phenotype of the or-
ganism and the environment in which the organism lives”).
64. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 362.
65. Id.
66. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE: THE LONG REACH OF THE GENE
110-11 (1982) (“[A] suicidal meme can spread, as when a dramatic and well-publicized martyr-
dom inspires others to die for a deeply loved cause, and this in turn inspires others to die, and so
on . . . .”); see also Geoffrey Cowley, Viruses of the Mind: How Odd Ideas Survive, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 14 (analyzing the Heaven’s Gate cult’s mass suicide from the memetic perspec-
tive).
67. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 364-65.
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Our highest values are therefore not necessarily the concepts that are
true or even beneficial but the concepts that have spread because of
their fitness.
If our highest values are simply the result of the fitness of selfish
replicators, where does that leave us? We exist the way we do be-
cause we are the best way for genes and memes to propagate them-
selves. “[M]emes restructure a human mind in order to make it a bet-
ter habitat for memes,” not for the benefit of the person.68 Just as
genes need to make an organism capable of reproducing in order to
sustain themselves, so must memes structure a mind to continue their
survival. Dennett captures this idea with a beautifully disturbing slo-
gan: “A scholar is just a library’s way of making another library.”69
While this idea is initially unsettling in a distinctly Nietzschean man-
ner, it really is nothing new. Biologically, we exist the way we do be-
cause that has been the most effective way of passing on our genes,
not because we are the most beautiful or powerful organism possible.
While we are the product of genetic (and memetic) mutation, we are
not the goal—we are the consequence of competitions for survival,
not a holy grail of perfection.70 From the gene’s- and meme’s-eye
view, we are a means, not an end.
The mind is thus a vehicle for memes to survive and spread.71 It is
a nest of memes and is shaped by the memes it encounters. The ideas
we encounter mold the way we think and pave the way for the accep-
tance or rejection of subsequent memes.72 A good example is educa-
tion: by its very nature, the idea of education encourages the explora-
tion and absorption of other ideas. The meme of faith, on the other
hand, is designed to disarm memes based on reason and scientific
proof.73 Memes change the architecture of a mind they enter: a mind
that is first infected by the meme of faith will find it difficult to accept
the meme of reason; conversely, if the meme of reason is first im-
planted, the meme of faith will be at a disadvantage. Without the
memes of space, time, and Newtonian physics, the meme of relativity
68. Id. at 365.
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id. at 365. This is an important and often misunderstood point. The only goals of evolu-
tion are survival and reproduction—in our case, high intelligence is simply a means to that end.
71. Or more graphically, “a sort of dungheap in which the larvae of other people’s ideas
renew themselves, before sending out copies of themselves in an informational diaspora.” Id. at
346.
72. Id. at 365.
73. Id. at 349.
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would not have the same replicative power that it does. The computer
is a helpful analogy: without certain ideas or programs (such as an
operating system) being introduced, other programs (such as word
processing programs or games) would be meaningless.
Under this view, the self is a result of memes acting on the hard-
ware of a brain. “[O]ur selves have been created out of the interplay
of memes exploiting and redirecting the machinery Mother Nature
has given us.”74 The particular memes encountered and their effects
on the physical brain create what is called a self or person. This idea
also is not new, at least in general terms; it merely states that a person
is the result of a combination of genetics and upbringing, of nature
and nurture.
But can’t a person choose among the various memes inhabiting
her mind? Dawkins famously—or infamously—ended The Selfish
Gene by declaring, “We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny
of the selfish replicators.”75 In an endnote, Dawkins discusses one
such example—sexual desire.76 He writes that, although humans have
“genes influencing sexual desire” they “have no trouble with curbing
their sexual desires when it is socially necessary to do so.”77 In one re-
spect, Dawkins certainly is correct: we can overcome the limitations
our genes place on us and curb our desires, and in this we seem to be
unique. But we are really only trading one set of shackles for another,
if we are inclined to take such a view. The only things that are curbing
sexual desire are the well-established memes of social decorum that
prohibit gratifying our urges in public.78 There is nothing left to over-
come our memes: “we” are a product of our memes and genes. “This
74. Id. at 367.
75. DAWKINS, supra note 47, at 201.
76. Id. at 332.
77. Id.
78. Dawkins is enigmatically silent about this possibility. He seems to intend the appella-
tion “selfish replicators” to apply both to genes and memes: “We are built as gene machines and
cultured as meme machines, but we have the power to turn against our creators.” Id. at 201. In
the endnote explaining this proposition, however, Dawkins claims “that it is perfectly possible
to hold that genes exert a statistical influence on human behaviour while at the same time be-
lieving that this influence can be modified, overridden or reversed by other influences.” Id. at
331. This explanation merely begs the question of what are the other influences. Memes are
ideal candidates to fill the role. He seems to go on to limit his original claim: “We, that is our
brains, are separate and independent enough from our genes to rebel against them.” Id. at 332.
He makes no statement at all whether it is possible to rebel against our memes, and this silence
encourages the inference that it is not.
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‘we’ that transcends not only its genetic creators but also its memetic
creators is . . . a myth.”79
This theory of cultural evolution by natural selection may be dif-
ficult initially to accept, as it reduces our selves to a combination of
factors beyond our control. The initial discomfort may be due to the
theory’s potential to upset long-held beliefs about metaphysical free-
dom, religion, and creativity.80 Or maybe the whole theory is just plain
wrong. But the theory does make sense on an intuitive level.81 If ideas
(including those of restraint and asceticism) do not enter our minds
through a process of natural selection, how do they get there? Con-
sider the meme of a catchy tune.82 Catchy tunes are by definition
evolutionarily fit (catchiness means high replicative power), but they
are not necessarily good for us; indeed most are downright annoying.
But they get stuck in our minds nonetheless, even if we do not want
them there. Thoughts pop into our minds all the time, without us
having willed them in, and it is a good thing for art-lovers. Mozart is
reputed to have said,
[w]hen I feel well and in a good humor, or when I am taking a drive
or walking after a good meal, or in the night when I cannot sleep,
thoughts crowd into my mind as easily as you would wish. Whence
and how do they come? I do not know and I have nothing to do with
it.83
Memetics thus purports to explain the riddle of how unbidden
thoughts creep into our minds, and this intuitive attractiveness is part
of what makes the idea both thrilling and disturbing.
The theory of memes offers a mechanical, algorithmic explana-
tion of cultural evolution. Though the parallels with genetics are not
strict, memetics retains the core process of selection based on fitness.
79. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 366.
80. The alteration or overturning of some of these values need not be disappointing or lead
to a sort of nihilism. For example, Dennett shows how the theory may lead to a more satisfying
view of creativity. We are now able to view our intellectual creations with pride because they
are essential products of the memes we harbor, and we are our memes. (In addition, we hold the
memes for liking our memes.) Thus, in a very real sense, our creative products are a part of us.
See DENNETT, supra note 48, at 355 (describing how individuals rarely pass memes on unal-
tered).
81. For one thing, it resolves a question that vexes any theory based on a pure free will,
namely, why are there differences in willpower?
82. See DENNETT, supra note 48, at 347 (using the example of a song from the 1950s).
83. Id. at 346. Dennett has expressed some doubt as to whether the quotation was in fact
from the composer. Id. at 346 n.4.
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It is this process, rather than the remaining details, that makes me-
metics interesting from a philosophical and legal point of view.84 This
Note now applies the theory of memetics to the cultural defense.
III.  WHY THE PURE CULTURAL DEFENSE CANNOT STAND
A. Theories of Punishment
The theory of memetics, of cultural evolution by natural selec-
tion, has profound consequences for the criminal justice system. This
Note is not the place to examine all of these effects,85 but it is neces-
sary to observe that, of the traditional justifications for punishment,
retribution suffers the harshest blow. As memetics explains all human
action in terms of causal factors, memes and genes, there is no room
for a will not resulting from these factors. Hence, retribution based on
free will cannot stand.86 In more general terms, memetics shows that a
person’s experiences shape his actions to a point where moral blame
for failing to overcome these experiences is unfounded.87
84. And again, it is the process, the mechanistic view of cultural evolution, that is essential
to the argument. Memetics is simply one of the best expressions of that view so far.
85. For example, I do not wish to debate the efficacy of various deterrents but merely wish
to shore up the foundation for a system of punishment.
86. This is not necessarily the same thing as eliminating all moral responsibility. There is an
evolutionary explanation of how morality arose. See id. at 453-93 (arguing for a more positive
approach to a “naturalized” ethics); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS
57-96 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1967) (1887) (describing how humans condi-
tioned themselves into morality). It makes perfect evolutionary sense to form an agreement to
conduct a society according to certain rules and to punish those who do not follow those rules.
Retribution in this sense is a necessary component of deterrence. This brand of retribution is of
a different ilk than traditional ideas of retribution based on moral blameworthiness, which focus
on whether the defendant could have done otherwise. See NIETZSCHE, supra, at 63
(“[P]unishment, as requital, evolved quite independently of any presupposition concerning
freedom or non-freedom of the will.”).
87. It is this idea, I think, that gives Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” its intuitive appeal. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the “veil of ignorance”).
Behind the veil of ignorance, a person is not permitted to take into account “his place in society,
his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natu-
ral assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.” Id. This veiled original position
for social contracting is fair because “[t]he arbitrariness of the world must be corrected for by
adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual situation.” Id. at 122. Initial endowments
are so important, because they alone determine future positions; in emphasizing their impor-
tance Rawls essentially denies a will free from genetic and cultural influence: “Even the willing-
ness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent
upon happy family and social circumstances.” Id. at 64. The original position and veil of igno-
rance combine to make a fair method of choosing a system of justice, because they eliminate
from consideration everything over which a person has no control, including the will. Though
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The volitional cultural defense thus fails to draw the line between
who should and should not be excused. The defense assumes that
Americans who were raised and educated in the “American culture”
have no cultural influences to overcome—that, absent any cognitive
or other psychological abnormalities, they will be able to conform
their actions to the law. Memetics shows us that this is not the case.
While the memes of American law may be reinforced more often for
someone raised in America than for an immigrant, it is the individual
ideas a person encounters—painted across her genotype—that de-
termine her actions. Justice would have to be truly individual to take
into account all these differences, but even if possible, it still would
not be moral in nature and hence would not provide any justification
for exceptions based on culpability.
Drastically reducing the role of retribution reveals the potential
importance of deterrence and rehabilitation. The criminal law deline-
ates conduct that is proscribed and thus identifies the thoughts and
acts that are unacceptable to a society. As the law is itself a meme,88
enforcement of the law can rewire a person’s mind to reflect the ac-
cepted bounds of conduct. For example, if a person believes that
killing one’s adulterous wife is accepted, the law can change the per-
son’s mental architecture to one that places the value of a human life
above the honor of a faithful wife. Every person is, of course, free to
disagree with the law, but in an organized society he must follow the
law or accept its consequences. Enforcement of the law informs and
reinforces the requirements of the law; it deters future prohibited
conduct and rehabilitates those who already have committed crimes.89
If the law is enforced uniformly, the resulting message is that society
will not tolerate such behavior, and this idea gets incorporated into
individuals’ value systems. The law cannot contain numerous excep-
tions and still establish its requirements as memes. Exceptions are
themselves memes, and care must be taken so that legal exceptions do
not become established norms.
The role of the criminal law is thus similar to that hypothesized
in a proto-society by Nietzsche and Dennett, among others.90 In the
Rawls did not couch it in such terms, his theory is an excellent example of contemplating a jus-
tice system while acknowledging that we are memetic and genetic products.
88. See generally Fried, supra note 10 (postulating that the law evolves as memes do).
89. Kim, supra note 15, at 103-04.
90. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 86, at 57-96 (claiming that for the great part of human his-
tory, responsibility for one’s actions had no bearing on one’s punishment). There are of course
many variants to the story, but the basic idea is one of social contract—a hypothetical group of
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hypothetical beginning, the law conditions people to overcome their
inherent selfish desires and provides incentives to cooperate with
others. As shown by prisoner’s dilemma games, cooperation is the ef-
ficient but not natural solution.91 Only by changing the expected pay-
offs can society hope to change the outcome of the game. This is the
law’s role—it reaches the previously unworkable solution by changing
the rewards and punishments. The law essentially reduces the payoff
for noncooperation to a point where it is rational to cooperate, re-
gardless of what other members of society choose to do. 92 There is an
element of conditioning the present as well, so that the immediate
impulse is to obey the law and not to compare outcomes and then de-
cide. This is the rewiring the law accomplishes, not some Orwellian
eradication of all non-American values. The law changes the incen-
tives of the game—but not the nature of the game—for all members
of society. And the incentives are not changed in exactly the same
way for everyone; the precise expected payoffs depend on one’s
memes and the values one places on different outcomes. The key
point is that only by the threat of punishment can the law recondition
people into avoiding socially inefficient, selfish strategies, and actual
punishment is required in order to make the threat credible. In order
to reach the desired behavior, the threatened payoffs must approxi-
mate the actual payoffs (or at least appear to do so). Thus, the me-
metic function of the law is to deter selfish conduct and encourage
cooperation.93
B. “Culture” Defined Broadly
Considered from another angle, it is apparent that the cultural
defense simply defines “culture” very narrowly. In cases such as
humans agrees to be bound by certain rules in exchange for the benefits such rules provide.
What this exposition attempts to demonstrate is that the general rule of law and an ordered so-
ciety are rational and not moral results (although if morality were divorced from a Kantian-type
free will, the two could conceivably be the same).
91. See, e.g., ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 2-3 (1992)
(explaining the standard prisoner’s dilemma game).
92. I am assuming that each decision to cooperate (i.e., commit a crime or not) is a separate
game. In an infinitely-repeated game, cooperation is indeed a viable strategy. Id. at 90-92.
93. Note that this view of the law does not condemn selfish, antisocial behavior as evil or
morally wrong. Indeed, in the absence of laws, some such conduct may be perfectly rational.
The goal of the law is to make it more rational to follow the rules and enjoy the benefits of a
well-ordered society.
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People v. Kimura94 and People v. Moua,95 the defense attempted to in-
troduce evidence of a specific tradition or custom that is accepted in a
specific society. These cases limit the defense to a practice that is for-
eign to America but is accepted elsewhere; they do not try to bring up
individual ideas and experiences of a defendant that may not be gen-
erally accepted in any society.96 This is a bit odd considering the broad
definitions of culture that some commentators have submitted: “the
abstract values, beliefs, and perceptions of the world that lie behind
people’s behavior”97 and “the body of beliefs, ideas, and ideals held
by an ethnic group.”98 Of course, defining culture so broadly is a large
step towards admitting that culture is something different for each
person, as ideas and ideals vary widely from person to person, even
within the same ethnic group. To be fair, culture is notoriously hard
to define,99 but the cultural defense seeks to excuse individuals be-
cause their actions were based upon their culture. To define culture
so narrowly as to include only traditional practices or rituals ignores a
vast part of the universe of human causation. Were these the only
causes of action, human cultures would be remarkably stagnant. Such
a narrow definition of culture also ignores the presence of counter-
cultures and people who leave a culture—what could possibly be in-
fluencing the minds of those who resist a society’s traditions? Me-
metics is thus useful because it focuses on all ideas and influences,
and not just an ill-defined, static group.
94. No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Nov. 21, 1985).
95. No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno County Feb. 7, 1985).
96. There is the specter of a “subcultural defense” that would seek to excuse defendants
whose beliefs were shaped by membership in a subculture, such as a gang. Renteln, supra note
6, at 497-98. Renteln criticizes the subcultural defense on the grounds that the defendants’
“worldview is not radically different from the rest of society. . . . [G]ang members do not believe
in witchcraft, coining, or other customs integral to a markedly different conceptual system.” Id.
at 497. While this may be true in some limited sense, the mental architecture that produces ac-
tion is influenced by more than belief or disbelief in the supernatural. This is why memetics is so
useful. Rather than bickering over which beliefs constitute valid excuses and how radical a
worldview must be, memetics acknowledges that all beliefs and worldviews are determinants of
action and that therefore everyone has an excuse.
97. Fischer, supra note 1, at 669 (quoting WILLIAM A. HAVILAND, ANTHROPOLOGY 277
(5th ed. 1989)).
98. Rimonte, supra note 4, at 1315.
99. Fischer, supra note 1, at 668 (observing that there are “over a hundred separate defini-
tions of culture”).
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C. Consequences of Memes
Though the volitional cultural defense lacks a sound philosophi-
cal basis, we should be careful when we choose to disallow the cul-
tural defense. It is here that consequentialist arguments become im-
portant. While it does not generally seem wise to maintain legal
mechanisms that are metaphysically untenable, a blanket prohibition
on cultural evidence may lead to some unwanted results. As the con-
sequences of the cultural defense have already been examined in
some detail, this Note will look at these consequences through the
memetic perspective; it will focus on which memes are encouraged by
the allowance or disallowance of the defense.
One of the primary justifications for allowing a cultural defense
is that it reflects and encourages multicultural sensitivity.100 The value-
pluralism that the cultural defense promotes is a necessary compo-
nent of the American ideals of freedom and liberty. To maintain
these ideals, Americans must not “foist[] upon all others a single or-
thodoxy,” but rather accept the beliefs and practices of the various
groups that comprise America as a whole.101 The amount of value a
society places on diversity is, in some sense, a measure of the impor-
tance that society places on liberty.102 It is difficult for a nation to
claim that it is founded upon ideas of freedom, tolerance, and per-
sonal liberty and at the same time not accept the values of other
groups.
The idea of equality is also encouraged by a pluralistic ideal. In
order to treat all citizens equally, a society must not proclaim that
only the values held by the majority are valid. “Equality among dif-
100. Note, supra note 2, at 1300. The author argues that individualization of the law is a key
component of our criminal justice system. Id. at 1298 nn. 28, 29. That seems to be the crucial
issue here. If everyone’s actions are a result of the ideas and experiences (combined with genet-
ics) that influence him or her, truly individualized justice would acquit everyone. We do not
want to blame people for actions they could not control, but we also think it necessary to punish
some people. We can have it both ways, if we are just a bit more honest. We could punish peo-
ple to establish the law’s deterrent and rehabilitative memes while not morally blaming anyone.
We should, however, still be aware of the other memes propagated by enforcement of
the law. If the law eliminates memes that encourage rape and murder, but in doing so spreads
memes of hatred and intolerance, the law should be examined to determine if there is a better
way of establishing its rules. Thus this section seeks to briefly examine the different possible
memetic effects of allowing or disallowing the cultural defense.
101. Id. at 1301.
102. Id. There is also an evolutionary benefit to diversity. Each culture is material with
which nature can accomplish design work. The fewer cultures there are, the fewer values we tol-
erate, the less material nature has to work with. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 514.
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ferent ethnic groups ultimately requires that each group respect other
groups’ rights to be different and that the majority not penalize a mi-
nority group just because it is different.”103 Respecting the beliefs and
practices, to an extent, of all its citizens is thus necessary for a society
that wishes to be serious about the value of equality.
Allowing the cultural defense is thus a good way to propagate
the memes of liberty and equality. Encouraging a pluralistic society
leads to the idea that all ethnic groups are to be respected and that
they are free to retain beliefs that are different from those of the ma-
jority. The alternative is “the possibility that repudiation of a cultural
defense may send out a broader message that an ethnic group must
trade in its cultural values for that of the mainstream if it is to be ac-
cepted as an equal by the majority.”104 Disallowance of the cultural
defense will spread the meme of value-monism, the idea that only the
majority’s values are valid. This meme will inhibit the spread of the
valued memes of liberty and equality.
The meme of value-monism is particularly dangerous because it
facilitates the propagation of the memes of intolerance, xenophobia,
and racism. Some minds, because of the implantation of previous
memes, are quite willing hosts for such memes. Their proclivities for
racial supremacy will cause them to seize upon any evidence that they
are indeed superior. The rejection of value-pluralism and the societal
ratification of the acceptability of only one set of ideas are just such
evidence. If only the majority’s values are accepted, those holding
contrary values are likely to be looked upon unfavorably.
Despite good intentions, allowing the cultural defense may also
promote some rather pernicious memes. Foremost among these is the
neglect of victim’s rights. This idea may take various forms, among
them the notions that the cultural defense legitimizes violence toward
women105 and that it permits violations of human rights.106 As cases
103. Note, supra note 2, at 1301.
104. Id. at 1302.
105. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1123 (“[T]he state effectively scraps conventional assault,
battery, murder, and abuse analysis” in cases involving “wife abuse, mother-child suicide, or fe-
male genital mutilation.”); see also Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Ex-
clusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1101 (1994) (“In many,
perhaps all, Asian cultures, the subordination of women is traditional and commonplace. When
we privilege the voices of Asian men, who rely on their cultures’ traditions of beating and killing
their wives to excuse their acts, women are silenced.” (citations omitted)).
106. Fischer, supra note 1, at 696-97 (declaring that some actions, such as murder and rape,
that violate human rights should not be tolerated in any society).
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such as Chen,107 Kimura,108 and Moua109 demonstrate, all too often it is
women and children who are the targets of violence. Any tolerance of
this violence by the judicial system helps spread the meme that vic-
tim’s rights are not to be taken seriously:
The message is sent that if you are an immigrant, you are not guar-
anteed the right to choose to escape those aspects of your culture (or
those stereotypes about your culture) that collide with the criminal
law. The victim in People v. Moua is a perfect example of this point.
She was an employee at Fresno State University who, like many
other young people her age, had left her community to work in an
office on campus. Had her parents not been Laotian, the California
penal code would have demanded serious punishment for Moua. . . .
Most frightening in this particular case is the fact that because the
court adopted the defendant’s view of the victim as a member of an
immigrant group (of Laotians) rather than as an individual (who
may or may not have accepted that culture), she was deprived of the
choice to say “No” to her rapist.110
If the cultural defense were accepted, Hmong women would have vir-
tually no protection from rape by Hmong men, regardless of whether
the women wished to subscribe to the practice of marriage-by-
capture.
As the preceding example demonstrates, nonenforcement of the
law when the case involves immigrants is discriminatory. The victim
in Moua was denied redress solely because of her membership in an
ethnic minority. Such selective enforcement of the law can be said to
violate the Equal Protection Clause, which applies equally regardless
of one’s citizenship.111 Minorities are denied the equal protection of
the laws based on their cultural heritage. From the victims’ perspec-
tive, it is irrelevant whether the failure to enforce the laws is due to
officials’ “wish to individualize justice through multiculturalism, or
because they just do not care as much about crime among immigrants
as they do about crime in the majority community.”112 Allowing vio-
lence toward minorities, even if the goal is to exculpate culturally mo-
tivated defendants, may propagate the meme of racism. If crimes
107. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
108. No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Nov. 21, 1985).
109. No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno County Feb. 7, 1985).
110. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1137 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1134.
112. Id. at 1135.
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against minorities are not enforced, those crimes may be discounted
in the popular psyche with the result that minority victims are given
less sympathy and care.113
The cultural defense may promote the meme of racism in a dif-
ferent, more paternalistic, way as well. This meme is the result of the
idea that ethnic minorities need different laws and hence are legally
isolated.114 The cultural defense is in this way condescending toward
other cultures—it excuses action based on foreign cultures by likening
it to insanity. The defense takes the view that other cultures are infe-
rior and barbaric but worthy of preservation. This may lead to a “pa-
tronizing and subtly racist hypertolerance that ‘respects’ vicious and
ignorant doctrines when they are propounded by officials of non-
European states and religions.”115 Thus, instead of objectively valuing
a group’s practices, as it arguably would for the majority, the cultural
defense ends the inquiry when it is discovered that the action was cul-
turally motivated. Rather than recognizing that a culture is organic
and that members of an ethnic group may not agree with all of a cul-
ture’s traditional practices, the defense isolates cultural groups with a
patronizing wink. This isolation may lead in turn to a balkanized law
and reinforce the idea that minorities should be treated differently.116
Furthermore, the cultural defense explicitly takes race and culture
into account in meting out criminal justice, and this “may not be a
good thing for a judicial system that is already plagued by a racist and
sexist history.”117
Thus, there is a fine line for the cultural defense between being
sympathetic toward ethnic defendants and ignoring the rights of vic-
tims. On both sides of the line is the possibility of encouraging the
meme of racism. Therefore, if we are to disallow the cultural defense,
as I have argued we should if it merely is of a volitional nature, we
must do so in a manner that is consistent with our goals, namely
spreading the memes of tolerance and protection for all.
Cultural evidence can of course still be used if it fits within the
existing framework. There seems to be no major problem with al-
lowing cultural evidence to establish, for example, provocation or ex-
113. Id. at 1135 n.207.
114. Chiu, supra note 105, at 1098.
115. DENNETT, supra note 48, at 517 n.1.
116. Coleman, supra note 1, at 1098 (noting that a balkanized law “is inconsistent . . . with
one of the law’s most fundamental objectives, the protection of society and all of its members
from harm”).
117. Id.
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treme emotional disturbance. Although there are some questions as
to how objective or subjective a reasonable person standard should
be,118 if a defendant can show that she was provoked, say, because of a
strong cultural stigma against adultery, her sentence should be re-
duced according to the guidelines of provocation. If a defendant
lacked the mens rea required for the crime, it should not matter why
(except in cases where the defendant is responsible for the lack of
mens rea, such as voluntary intoxication). This is fundamentally dif-
ferent from a defense that admits all the elements of the crime but
seeks to reduce punishment based on culpability; the use of cultural
evidence within the existing framework is not at all discouraged by
the application of memetics.
The use of cultural evidence does not appear to be a paper tiger,
either. As many of the cases seem to involve extreme anger or shame
brought about by unfaithful spouses, the defendants still would be
able to make arguments based on provocation and extreme emotional
disturbance. A true cultural defense only would be necessary when
the defendant could not claim such emotional instability or use an-
other defense.
It also might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of a cogni-
tive cultural defense based on ignorance of the law. Ordinarily igno-
rance of the law is no excuse; however, there do appear to be some
instances where cultural factors seem to have dominated the defen-
dant’s perception of what is legal.119 There are numerous potential
problems, however. First, the law essentially would be applying the
laws of other countries to people who may have claimed that they
were not familiar with American laws. Second, it is unfair to the vic-
tims, who thought they were protected by American laws. Third, ex-
cuse based on ignorance of the law does more than simply encourage
more ignorance; it defeats the memetic power of the law. All of these
are good reasons why ignorance of the law is not a traditional de-
fense, and any attempt to change the status quo should include a ex-
planation of why culturally influenced ignorance is different from
other kinds.
118. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 48 (N.Y. 1986) (finding that the standard of
“reasonableness” must “retain an objective element”).
119. A good example is Regina v. Adesanya, a case in which a Nigerian mother ritualistically
scarred her sons’ faces without a clue that such conduct constituted assault in England. Renteln,
supra note 6, at 483-84.
GORDON 06/02/01 2:36 PM
2001] IMPLICATIONS OF MEMETICS 1833
The use of the cultural defense in cognitive cases such as igno-
rance of the law is more philosophically sound than in volitional
cases, because the former is not based solely on moral culpability. If a
defendant is aware of the law but cannot conform his behavior to it,
excusing him would be based on the mistaken assumption that others
are able to conform their action to the law willingly. Punishing some-
one for being ignorant of the law, however, makes a much clearer dis-
tinction—that person has not been informed of the law in any manner
whereas others have. Punishing that person is effective only to the ex-
tent that it reduces ignorance of the law. Thus, while establishing a
cognitive cultural defense based on ignorance of the law is more
sound than volitional cultural defenses, it still must be compared to
the effects on the law meme. And if allowing a defense of ignorance
of the law will change the expected payoffs in a way that society finds
undesirable, it must be abandoned.
CONCLUSION
Memetic theory seems to imply that eventually memes that are
not fit for a new environment will not be replicated. Thus, the mar-
riage-by-capture meme may eventually die out in a society that views
sexual consent as a good. This does not obviate the need for punish-
ment, however. Punishment is an essential component of the envi-
ronment or fitness landscape. It plays a key role in determining which
memes are fit to replicate. Without punishment, we could only say
that we would not like certain memes to replicate, but they would still
be able to do so dependent on their own fitness. Punishment—in
whatever form, from incarceration to disapproval and shunning—
changes the fitness of the memes. By and large, memes will not be
that catchy if they lead their hosts to prison.120 This is the catalytic role
of law: it drives out the memes that a society views as harmful.
The memetic perspective essentially dispenses with ideas of ret-
ribution and punishment based on freedom of the will. This in turn
shows that a pure volitional cultural defense, one that seeks to excuse
a defendant merely because he could not overcome his cultural influ-
120. Memes that harm their hosts still can be successful replicators. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, as the web of memes is vast and entangled, it is difficult to say
that one meme is solely responsible for an action. The meme of vandalism, for example, should
have died out as it provides little benefit and may result in a good deal of harm to its host. The
meme has managed to propagate, however, in large part because of other, reinforcing memes
such as the desire to rebel and the hatred of authority.
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ences, lacks a sound metaphysical foundation. All action is the result
of cultural influence, and, whether we like it or not, all punishment
seems to be the result of having had the wrong influences. Thus, me-
metics properly turns the focus of the law to its deterrent and reha-
bilitative components instead of vague notions of moral wrongdoing.
The power of law to affect memetic fitness, and hence action, should
not be undermined by excuses founded upon lessened culpability.
